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Abstract 
Outside the cognitive psychologist’s laboratory, problem solving is an activity that takes 
place in a rich web of interactions involving people and artefacts. This interactivity is 
constituted by fine-grained actions-perception cycles, and it allows a reasoner’s 
comprehension of the problem to emerge from a coalition of internal and external resources. 
Taking an ecological approach to problem solving, this article introduces a qualitative 
method, Cognitive Event Analysis, for studying the fine-grained interactivity between a 
problem solving agent and his/her environment. To demonstrate the potential of this method, 
it is used to study a single subject solving the so-called 17 Animals problem using a material 
model. The fine-grained procedure allows tracking the solution to a serendipity that was 
brought about because of the participant’s aesthetic considerations and a change in her 
perceptual figure-ground configuration. While a qualitative single-case method cannot prove 
specific models of problem solving, it questions prevalent mentalist models, and it generates 
new hypotheses on insight problem solving, because it allows the researcher to attend to 
outliers and to variability on a fast and fine-grained between-measurement timescale. 
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Introduction 
In recent years, the field of problem solving psychology has witnessed the upsurge of a 
theoretical alternative to the traditionally dominant model of cognitive science. In the 
traditional model, “an intelligent agent – be it animal, human, robot or space 
alien – can be modelled  in a precise way by specifying its representations, its basic processes 
and its control structure” (Ohlsson, 2011:37). According to this assumption, “to explain a 
behavior (or a regularity therein) is to specify a program, that is, a control structure, a set of 
processes and a stock of representations, that generates this behavior (or regularity)” 
(Ohlsson, 2011:37). A cognitive psychology along these lines is named mentalism – “if it 
needs any other name than common sense,” as Ohlsson (2011):28 confidently adds. From this  
mentalist point of view, “mind is the proper subject matter of psychology” (Ohlsson, 
2011:25), and this “mind is a system” (Ohlsson, 2011:28) that “consists of representations” 
(Ohlsson, 2011:29). Gregory (1998:1683) sums up this foundational assumption as follows: 
“the key notion of cognitive psychology since the collapse of behaviourism is that we build 
brain descriptions of the world of objects, which give perception and intelligent behaviour”. 
The alternative perspective strives “to understand how organisms make their way in the 
world, not how a world is made inside of organisms” (Reed, 1996:11). “Making one’s way in 
the world” is a matter of upholding homeostasis through the regulation the organism-
environment relations: “organisms are primarily sensitive to, and act so as to select and 
maintain desired values of, salient organism-environment relationships” (Anderson, 
2014:136). Given the emphasis on embodiment, ecological embeddedness, and agency, the 
alternative has been named embodied cognition, embedded cognition, enacted cognition, and 
ecological cognition (for an overview, see Robbins and Aydede (2009)). In line with a more 
general ecological approach to cognition, this article argues for, and contributes to such an 
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ecological approach to problem solving, i.e. the study of how cognitive agents reach a (more 
or less well-defined) goal, given some opening condition. 
Traditionally, two broad classes of problems have been the focus of research on 
problem solving. The first are transformation or analytic problems. For those, given the initial 
state specified in the problem presentation, participants transform the problem through a 
series of intermediate states with the repeated application of simple operators—the Tower of 
Hanoi (Anzai & Simon, 1979) or river crossing problems (Knowles & Delaney, 2005) are 
examples of such problems. Cognitive psychologists and computer scientists are primarily 
interested in the processes that underpin the search for and selection of moves that trace a 
path of possible legal intermediate states in a well-delineated problem space. In the second 
class we find so-called insight problems: for those, there are no obvious intermediate 
stages—nor obvious operators that can produce those stages—that map a path from initial 
state to goal state. In fact such problems are designed to create an initial interpretation that 
results in an impasse (of sorts). These problems often take the form of riddles, for example: 
How can you throw a ping pong ball in such a manner that it comes to a complete stop and 
reverses direction without coming into contact with a physical surface (cf. Ansburg & 
Dominowski, 2000)? A key misleading assumption—namely, a horizontal throwing 
motion—must be abandoned in favour of a new interpretation: the throwing motion is 
vertical. 
While analytic and heuristic search processes figure prominently in models of 
transformation problem solving (e.g. Simon & Reed, 1976), their role in insight problem 
solving have been the matter of debate (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009; Ohlsson, 2011; 
Weisberg, 2015). Insight may well proceed once a problem representation has been 
restructured (i.e., the initial interpretation of the problem is shed for a different one), but the 
debate focuses on whether the restructuring is evinced through conscious analyses or the sub-
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conscious redistribution of associative strengths among semantic elements. Fleck and 
Weisberg (2013) have offered an integrative framework wherein insight problem solving can 
proceed from analytic and sub-conscious processes; while such a synthesis does justice to a 
range of theoretical perspectives on insight problem solving, it remains firmly mentalist and 
commits unconditionally to methodological individualism—the explanations offered for 
creativity and problem solving performance only focus on processes within the individual.  
Given this state of affairs, what would a more ecological take on problem solving look 
like? An interesting avenue of insight problem solving research explores the role of cues and 
hints (Ball & Litchfield, 2013; Kirsh, 2009). For instance, using Duncker’s (1945) radiation 
problem1, participants are more likely to formulate a divide-and-conquer solution if relevant 
features of the diagrammatic representation—such as the healthy tissue perimeter—are 
animated to attract attention (Grant & Spivey, 2003, Experiment 2). Insight is also more 
likely if participants follow the gaze of a successful participant as he or she scans the tumor 
and surrounding healthy tissue, that is, observe someone’s saccades that jump from the 
tumour to different points along and outside the healthy tissue perimeter (Litchfield & Ball, 
2011). Perhaps more interesting is the finding that participants encouraged to engage in 
similar eye movements (movements that jump from the tumour to cardinal points along the 
periphery) while tracking numbers superimposed on a diagrammatic representation of the 
problem are more likely to discover the solution (Thomas & Lleras, 2007).  
This strand of research has significantly advanced our understanding of how cues and 
hints can attract attention and guide the generation and evaluation of ideas (Kirsh, 2009). 
However, in the research on Duncker’s radiation problem, participants work in a fixed 
environment with a static problem presentation in the shape of the diagram illustrating the 
tumour and surrounding healthy tissue. In such a lab environment, the nature, timing and 
frequency of cues are experimentally engineered, and hence participants cannot scaffold their 
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thinking by modifying the problem presentation or any artefacts that represent the problem. 
Accordingly, while the cueing approach has demonstrated the importance of what the 
environment “offers the [agent], what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill” (Gibson, 
1979:127), we worry that this line of research does not pay sufficient attention to another 
equally important dimension of the ecological embeddedness of cognitive agents. Thus, when 
an agent acts in the world, s/he changes the world, and perceiving these changes reveals new 
affordances for action. In the context of problem solving, an ecologically embedded agent 
acts in ways that modify the problem presentation. Hence, real-life problem solving, we 
suggest, depend on the tightly coupled action-perception cycles through which a cognitive 
agent explores and exploits his/her environment.  
This interplay between action and perception in the dynamics between cognitive agents 
and their environment have in recent years been studied under the rubric of interactivity 
(Cowley & Nash, 2013; Cowley & Vallée-Tourangeau, 2013; Guthrie, Vallée-Tourangeau, 
Vallée-Tourangeau, & Howard, 2015; Kirsh, 2015; Steffensen, 2013; Vallée-Tourangeau, 
2012, 2013; Vallée-Tourangeau, Euden, & Hearn, 2011; F. Vallee-Tourangeau & Payton, 
2008; G. Vallee-Tourangeau & Vallee-Tourangeau, 2014; Villejoubert & Vallee-Tourangeau, 
2011). While the concept has its roots in Human-Computer Interaction (Kirsh, 1997), this 
recent literature on interactivity has shown that the fine-grained exchanges between a human 
agent and a computer generalise to many, if not all, aspects of human cognition. Following 
this generalisation, Steffensen (2013:196) has defined interactivity as “sense-saturated 
coordination that contributes to human action.” The definition pivots on coordination, 
because the organism, in order to stay alive, is bound to uphold far-from-equilibrium 
homeostasis (i.e. the ability to maintain a steady state in a dynamic context) through 
regulating the organism-environment relation. This regulation amounts to the coordination of 
material, energetic and informational processes between organism and environment. 
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However, human beings mesh real-life coordination with sociocultural knowledge: here-and-
now coordination is constrained by values and experiences ascribed to the here-and-now. In 
short, coordination is saturated with sense. Further, such sense-saturated coordination has an 
ecological function: the human access to sociocultural resources enable the species to 
perform actions and achieve results that were otherwise out of reach.  
Thus defined, interactivity weaves a contingent spatio-temporal trajectory, constituted 
by the action-perception dynamics between agent and environment. The agent and the 
environment metamorphose into a seamless cognitive ecosystem that follows a unique 
cognitive trajectory, that is, a dynamical and non-linear path that the system creates as it 
achieves a given cognitive result. Crucially, as the agent acts along the cognitive trajectory, 
the problem presentation is transformed, and that transformation creates a shifting stream of 
problem configurations and perceptual feedback. While these dynamics may appear as a kind 
of “unintentional self-cueing” (afforded by the agent’s actions), we would argue that such an 
interpretation strengthens the implicit commitment to methodological individualism. Rather, 
we trace the emergent cues to the self-organising dynamics of the cognitive ecosystem: the 
problem configuration at one point affords, or cues, a certain course of actions, which may 
create an inflection point in the problem solving trajectory. What may count as a pertinent 
cue for a reasoner is thus neither independent of the reasoner, nor of the spatio-temporal 
coordinates at which the problem is configured in a certain way. In other words, what makes 
a cue an effective one, one that turns into an “interesting idea” (Kirsh, 2009), is not defined in 
terms of its physical features independent of the reasoner’s history and his/her problem 
solving efforts up to that point.  
An interactivity-based view on problem solving offers a new theoretical perspective on 
a host of cognitive questions. Equally important, though, it points to new methodological 
avenues in the study of problem solving. Interactivity weaves a spatio-temporal trajectory, 
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along which agents act and perceive and environmental structures cue and afford, and 
interactivity can, for that reason, be observed, recorded, analysed, and scrutinized. 
Accordingly, fine-grained observations of interactivity enable the study of cognition in terms 
of events where cognitive ecosystems achieve cognitive results. This methodological 
dimension comes to the fore in the following two sections where we first present Cognitive 
Event Analysis, an interactivity-based method for studying cognition, and second demonstrate 
the kinds of insights it engenders when applied to a participant solving the 17 Animal 
problem. Finally, in the discussion, we reflect on the insights generated by such a single-case 
study, on the methodological aspects of Cognitive Event Analysis, and, finally, how an 
interactivity-based approach contributes to an ecological understanding of problem solving, 
cognition and representations. 
Cognitive Event Analysis 
In this section we introduce a way of approaching the interactivity of problem solving, 
namely a qualitative method called Cognitive Event Analysis (CEA). CEA is rooted in 
cognitive anthropology and distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995, 2003, 2014), and closely 
connected with the so-called Distributed Language Approach (Chemero, 2003; Cowley, 
2007a, 2009, 2011, 2012; Cowley & Madsen, 2014). This dual origin is reflected in the 
method: on the one hand, it has inherited Hutchins’s commitment to study human cognition, 
and on the other hand, it builds on how linguists and interaction analysts meticulously study 
interactional particulars. Combining these two lineages, CEA studies cognitive ecosystems 
via a microscopic focus on the bodily and inter-bodily dynamics of gesture, prosody, 
movements, etc. CEA has both been applied to naturalistic and experimental data; in the 
former category, one finds Steffensen’s (2013) study of problem solving in an office setting, 
Pedersen’s (2015) study of the cognitive ecology in an emergency department, and Pedersen 
and Steffensen’s (2014) single case study of faecal colour categorization. In the latter 
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category, Cowley and Nash (2013) conducted a study of the river-crossing problem, and 
Steffensen (Submitted) has reviewed the use of CEA across settings. Further, the method is 
closely related to Goodwin’s application of interactional methods to study cognitive 
phenomena, in particular colour classification and learning (Goodwin, 1994, 1997, 2000a, 
2000b, 2013; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996; Koschmann, LeBaron, Goodwin, & Feltovich, 
2011), and Cowley’s work on how cognition is constrained by language, prosody and inter-
bodily dynamics (Cowley, 1997a, 1997b, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2007b, 2014; Cowley & 
MacDorman, 2006). Based on fine-grained observations of interactivity, CEA studies 
cognitive ecosystems by investigating the system’s cognitive trajectory, i.e. the dynamical 
and non-linear path that the system creates as it achieves a given cognitive result. CEA 
particularly focuses on phase transitions along this trajectory. A given configuration of 
transition points constitute an event in Chemero’s (2000b:39) sense, that is, a change “in the 
layout of affordances of the animal-environment system.” According to Chemero’s definition, 
an event is a change in the relation between agent and environment, where an agent acts on 
her environment, perceives the consequences of that action, and then enacts another change 
in the environment. Obviously, the perceived consequences may differ widely from the 
intended consequences. A single transition point (for instance the overcoming of an impasse 
in an insight problem task) may be pivotal for making this event happen. Such transition 
points are in CEA termed event pivots (Steffensen, 2013:201). An event pivot is thus 
functionally defined as a transition point which is a conditio sine qua non for identifying a 
segment of a cognitive trajectory as a specific (kind of) event. As a parallel, if one 
understands a goal-scoring foray in soccer as an event, the various passes and dribbles may 
all be part of the event’s trajectory, but it is the last header which defines the event as “a 
successful foray.” Hence, that header is the event pivot, enabled by previous actions by other 
players. 
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Chemero’s event concept is crucial for understanding the ecological embeddedness of 
living agents’ cognitive trajectories. However, as observed by Di Paolo (2005):442, it is 
necessary to distinguish between changes undergone by the agent from changes done by the 
agent. In the latter case, the cognitive event is an achievement: it is the result of the agent’s 
behaviour (whether it matches the agent’s intention or not). Acknowledging the fact that 
cognitive trajectories are animated by agents in real time, allows us to understand a cognitive 
result (e.g. when the subject in a problem solving experiment solves the task) as enabled by 
preceding behaviour. This focus on results gives rise to an important methodological 
principle in CEA: “the research should start from the determination of the results of 
behaviour and lead to the necessary constituents of the living system determining the 
achievement of these results” (Järvilehto, 2009:118). In other words, in contrast to living 
agents who move forwards along a cognitive trajectory, we work backwards along the same 
trajectory, from the cognitive result to its constituents. Paraphrasing Reed, we can say that 
just as cognition is all about an organism finding its way in the world, so is the cognitive 
result the particular way found by the organism. 
The focus on cognitive results implies that the proper unit of analysis is not necessarily 
the individual agent. Thus, since a large class of cognitive results are not brought forth by 
individuals, but by teams and systems relying on technological means, the unit of analysis is 
the distributed cognitive system, which can be defined as “a system that can dynamically 
configure itself to bring subsystems into coordination to accomplish various functions” 
(Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000:176). Having identified a cognitive result, one can in turn 
identify the constituents of the particular “distributed cognitive system […] that produces 
cognitive outputs, just as an agricultural system yields agricultural products” (Giere, 
2007:318).2 
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To summarise the basic assumptions of CEA, a self-organising distributed cognitive 
system, animated by at least one living agent, creates a cognitive trajectory, as it moves 
towards a cognitive result. Achieving a cognitive result is a cognitive event which depends on 
a specific configuration of transition points along the cognitive trajectory. The most salient 
transition points function as event pivots. In order to understand the cognitive system and the 
cognitive trajectory, we thus need to take a starting point in cognitive results and event 
pivots. 
The methodological procedure in CEA 
The data material for a cognitive event analysis is a video record, not necessarily based 
on naturalistic data: as one of the few qualitative methods in cognitive science (Ormerod & 
Ball, 2010), CEA can in principle yield equally good results when applied to  experimental 
data as long as the experimental procedure is designed such that participants can interact with 
a physically modifiable problem presentation. The analytical procedure consists of five 
consecutive steps based on the video record, as outlined in Table 1 (and exemplified with the 
analysis presented later in this article).3 
---------------------------- 
TABLE 1 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
In the cognitive event identification, one identifies a single event―be it an instance of 
problem solving, decision-making, change of attention, or the like―in the data set and selects 
it for further scrutiny. In identifying an event, one can both rely on external criteria (i.e. pre-
formed scientific criteria, for instance when problem solving researchers see a behavioural 
pattern as an impasse), or on internal criteria (i.e. per-formed participant-derived criteria, for 
instance if a subject enacts an aha! moment, whether she actually has overcome the impasse 
or not).  
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In the second procedure, the event pivot identification, one identifies what in the first 
place prompted the event identification. Thus, if one has identified a problem solving event, 
the very moment where the subject actually solves the problem is an obvious event pivot. 
Likewise, if the problem is an insight problem, overcoming the impasse may be an event 
pivot. Again, the soccer metaphor is useful: if the event we want to study is a goal, the pivot 
is the header or shot that makes the ball cross the goal line, but we could equally well decide 
to study how the defence organises an offside trap, defining the referee decision as the event 
pivot. When an event pivot is identified in the data material, the cognitive trajectory acquires 
a gradient structure: if the pivot is seen as a temporal “hotspot,” there will be a “warm” peri-
pivotal zone which is crucial for the course of the cognitive trajectory.  
After the event pivot identification follows a data annotation procedure. When annotating 
video data, one needs to consider two interdependent questions: how does one select 
annotation categories? And how dense should the annotation be? The first question can be 
further differentiated. To begin, one needs to decide on the domains to be annotated: 
minimally, given the cognitive focus on how agents achieve cognitive results, it is 
compulsory to annotate participant behaviour and various functionally defined features of the 
cognitive task (e.g. the moves made in the River Crossing Problem, the position of animals in 
the 17 Animals Problem, or the position of the disks in the Tower of Hanoi Problem). 
Further, one may also annotate relevant circumstantial events (e.g. experimenter probing and 
cueing, or by-passer activity), and it is likewise possible to embed physiological measures 
(heart rate, galvanic skin response, etc.) and performance measures (reaction time, etc.) in the 
annotation. For some domains, in particular participant behaviour, the complexity is so vast, 
that one needs to define a hierarchy of levels. Imagine a person having lunch: while on an 
overall level, this can be annotated as a single activity (“having lunch”), it is likely to be 
composed by several sequential actions: taking a bite of the bread, drinking a sip of water, 
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take a bite of the salad, etc. Each of these actions, in turn, consists of sequential or 
synchronous acts; thus, the manual conduct differs immensely between taking a bite of the 
bread (holding the bread in one hand) and taking a bite of the salad (using a fork to catch a 
mouthful). Participant behaviour also allows for another kind of differentiation: while the 
action of taking a bite of the bread depends on the coordination of several movements 
(manual movements, turning the head, and opening/closing the mouth), the vast number of 
acts call for a distinguishing between different modalities (e.g. utterances, gestures, manual 
movements, posture, gaze, handling of objects).  
For each of the annotation categories, there will be a number of descriptors. In most 
cases, it is possible to establish a constrained categorisation so a domain or level has a limited 
number of possible descriptors. For instance, in this article, we operate with 7 activity 
categories (cf. Table 3) and 17 action categories. Likewise, our two functional domains, zebra 
distribution and pen structure, are constrained as the annotation values are numerical. 
However, when it comes to the annotation of acts within different modalities, most categories 
will be open-ended. For instance, the annotation of utterances (i.e. a transcription) must be as 
diverse as the utterances themselves, and what people do with their hands can hardly be 
captured through an exhaustive list of acts.4  
The second question is how dense the annotation should be. While there are no 
principled criteria for the annotation granularity, the analysis requires a rather fine-grained 
annotation level. For a comparison, Anzai and Simon (1979) “microscopic account” of a 
single agent solving the Tower of Hanoi task relies on 232 annotations (224 “protocol 
statements” interspersed by 8 experimenter statements) for a 90 minutes session. This gives 
an annotation density of 0.043 annotations per second, and since all annotations are on the 
same level (i.e. there is no overlapping annotations) their median annotation length is 23.28 
seconds. In contrast, the analysis in this article builds on 1,291 annotations, spread over 13 
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levels, for a 10 minutes session. This gives an annotation density on 2.152 annotations per 
second, which is a granularity 50 times as high as Anzai and Simon’s. Our median annotation 
length is 6.04 seconds (calculated as the length of the session times number of annotation 
levels, divided by number of annotations), spanning from a median annotation length of 1.60 
seconds on the most fine-grained level (right hand movements) to 100 seconds on the most 
coarse-grained level (pen overlaps). However, annotation density may vary across the data 
set: while participant behaviour needs to be mapped very precisely when it comes to the 
specific dynamics that bring about an event pivot or a phase transition, it may be less relevant 
to document, say, a participant’s hand movements, as s/he reads the task. It is, however, not 
always the case that one knows what one needs, and it is thus not always possible to define 
beforehand where one needs a high annotation density. It might therefore be necessary to 
elaborate and refine the annotation during the analysis.  
Based on patterns in the annotations, one can now perform a segmentation of the 
cognitive trajectory, using changes in behavioural patterns as an indicator of transition points 
on the cognitive trajectory. If a specific configuration of annotation values only appears in a 
given segment of a cognitive trajectory, the start and end point of this pattern are two 
transition points along the cognitive trajectory. This procedure is not unlike that of Anzai and 
Simon (1979) who divide their protocol statements into four episodes, “corresponding to the 
subject’s four solution attempts” (Anzai & Simon, 1979:126). This episodic segmentation 
depends on the observation of transition points (avant la lettre), for instance when the subject 
says “If I go on like this, I won’t be able to do it, so I’ll start over again” (Anzai & Simon, 
1979:138). 
CEA’s final procedure is an interpretive procedure aimed at answering the question: 
what were the enabling conditions for the cognitive result, and how was it achieved by the 
cognitive system animated by one or more living agents? An answer to this question emerges 
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when the event pivot is interpreted as the result of immediately preceding events that in turn 
are traced to events preceding these. Moving backwards along the cognitive trajectory, using 
the trajectory segmentation as a heuristic tool, one thus establishes one or more explanatory 
chains. This approach can be supplemented by tracing specific peri-pivotal actions to general 
behavioural patterns along the observed trajectory. While such a behavioural tendency may 
be fully unrelated to the cognitive result, iteratively occurring actions indicate an agent’s 
animating force, which she may exploit to achieve a cognitive result. Having outlined the 
basic assumptions and analytical procedures of CEA, in the remainder of the article we 
demonstrate its value for problem solving psychology.  
Method 
In this study we analyse a single successful solver in a recent study on the 17 Animals 
problem (further discussed by Vallée-Tourangeau, Steffensen, Vallée-Tourangeau, and Makri 
(2015)). By tracking a specific cognitive trajectory, the analysis shows what enabled the 
participant to reach a solution. 
Participant 
The participant is P27, a 24 year old right-handed female. A Kingston University 
undergraduate, she received course credit for her participation. P27 was randomly selected 
among the 6 successful solvers in the sample of 50 participants described in Vallée-
Tourangeau et al. (2015). 
Task 
Like all 50 participants in the study, P27 was presented with the 17 Animals problem: 
“Describe how to put 17 animals in 4 enclosures in such a way that there is an odd number of 
animals in each enclosure.” 17A is disguised as an arithmetic problem, and as such it is 
unsolvable since the sum of four odd numbers is an even number. To solve the problem, 
participants must see it as a set theoretical problem, where one or more elements can be part 
Cognitive Events in a Problem-solving Task   16 
of more than one set. Under this condition, solving the problem is clearly unproblematic; 
possible solutions are shown in Figure 1.  
----------------------------- 
FIGURE 1 APP. HERE 
----------------------------- 
Materials 
Like all other participants under this condition, P27 was presented with a pile of pipe 
cleaners of varying length (app. 5-10 cm long), some of which are being reused from prior 
participants, as well as 17 figurines shaped like zebras (app. 3x2x1.5 cm; see Fig. 2). The 
pipe cleaners (henceforth, PC) were material artefacts with which enclosures could be 
constructed, and zebras were stand-ins for the animals in the task formulation. Given the 
artefacts employed in this study, we use the terms zebra and pen as referents to the general 
categories of animals and enclosures in the remainder of this article. 
---------------------------- 
FIGURE 2 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
Procedure 
The participants were tested individually. They were initially given a pen and piece of 
paper on which to sketch a solution for the 17A problem. Participants were given three 
minutes to do so. This initial presentation phase was designed to measure the participants’ 
comprehension of the problem and to determine whether they conceived the problem in 
arithmetic terms. All did.  After an interval of approximately 20 minutes— during which they 
completed a Working Memory assessment (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005), a 
Need for Cognition assessment  (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984), and an Actively Open-
minded Thinking assessment (Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013)—participants were sat at a 
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large rectangular work surface with pipe cleaners, 17 zebra figures,  and the following sheet 
of instructions: “For the next 10 minutes we would like you to work on the problem using the 
17 animal objects and the various pipe cleaners to construct the animal enclosures to show 
how to put 17 animals in 4 enclosures in such a way that there is an odd number of animals in 
each enclosure.” Cameras were mounted on the ceiling above the work space and recorded 
the session.  
Video records were coded using ELAN 4.6.2 (http://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/), 
developed by the Max-Planck-Institute for Psycholinguistics (Wittenburg, Brugman, Russel, 
Klassmann, & Sloetjes, 2006). The coding process pertained to three domains: participant 
behaviour, zebra distribution, and pen structure. Participant behaviour was coded on three 
hierarchically embedded levels: activity, action, and acts. Zebra distribution is a constrained 
category, in that the total number of zebras to distribute is 17. A zebra can either be in a 
participant’s hand (or held by both hands), or on the table. In the latter case, they can either 
be in the zebra pile or in a pen. Accordingly, we coded for number of zebras (0-17) in six 
spatially defined categories: the participants’ hands, the zebra pile, and pen 1-4. The sum of 
zebras in these six categories is 17. The third coding domain, pen structure, refers to changes 
in the spatial layout of pens. The default layout for all participants is to place four pens next 
to each other, usually in a two times two matrix (as illustrated in Figure 3). This default pen 
structure is not coded, only deviations from the default, i.e. when one or more overlaps 
between one or more pens are present. 
---------------------------- 
FIGURE 3 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
The criterion for coding pen structure and zebra position is functional, as these two properties 
are necessary for determining whether a cognitive result has been achieved in 17A: only if an 
Cognitive Events in a Problem-solving Task   18 
overlap is present can a solution be achieved, and only when a specific distribution of zebras 
is present, is a solution achieved. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the coding categories in the three domains, indicating the 
total number of coding annotations for the participant analysed in this article. Table 3 lists the 
coding categories for activities (and activity objects) in the coding of participant behaviour. 
Likewise, Table 4 lists the coding categories for actions (and action objects) in the coding of 
participant behaviour. 
---------------------------- 
TABLE 2 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
---------------------------- 
TABLE 3 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
---------------------------- 
TABLE 4 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
A cognitive event in 17A: the case of P27 
Approaching the cognitive trajectory 
Since 17A is designed to deceive participants to think of the problem as an arithmetic 
one, the key to understand cognitive trajectories in this particular task is to identify how 
participants realize that they are dealing with a set theoretical problem. From the point of 
view of CEA, this realization is the primary event pivot. In the problem solving literature this 
is characterized as an insight that reflects a restructuring or representational change, either the 
product of unconscious processes according to proponents of the Special Process view  
(Davidson, 1995; Ohlsson, 1992) or the product of conscious analytic processes according to 
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proponents of the Business as Usual view (Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 
1995). Irrespective of theoretical explanation of such changes in the cognitive trajectory, it is 
evident that “something happens,” and that this something paves the way for a solution. We 
refer to this something as the breakthrough, here defined as a reconfiguration of the 
distributed cognitive system which enables the system to achieve an acceptable solution to 
the problem at hand. Whether a breakthrough depends on an insight or an analytical 
procedure cannot be a priori determined, because the specific patterns of interactivity that 
constitute such insights and analytical procedures are self-organized and open-ended. 
Having defined an event pivot, we can likewise define a secondary event pivot. Following 
Murray and Byrne’s (2013) distinction between single-step and multiple-step problems, 17A 
is a multiple-step problem in that the realisation that the problem is a set theoretical problem 
is not in itself a sufficient solution. Within this more adequate understanding of the problem, 
participants still need to achieve a correct (set theoretical) solution. We define this point at 
the cognitive trajectory as the secondary event pivot.5 
Building on the annotations described in detail in the methods/procedures section above, 
we identify different behavioural patterns along P27’s cognitive trajectory. Accordingly, we 
can segment it into seven phases, as indicated in Table 5.  
---------------------------- 
TABLE 5 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
P27 spends the first 1:52 minutes preparing the task. She reads the instruction and folds four 
pens out of the available pipe cleaners. The second phase, Tryout 1, is the longest in the 
experiment: P27 engages in a single activity type (relocating zebras) for 3:47 minutes. In this 
phase P27’s working assumption is that she is solving an arithmetic problem. P27 first spends 
24.8 seconds on distributing the zebras from the zebra pile into the four pens, followed by 
Cognitive Events in a Problem-solving Task   20 
3:22 minutes of shuffling the zebras from one pen to another. Having distributed all zebras 
and attempted to reach an arithmetic solution, P27 gives up and is evidently stuck. Thus, in a 
26 seconds impasse phase, she relocates the zebras back into a pile at the middle of the work 
table which takes her 15.2 seconds. Having done so, she sits motionless, observing the 
workspace for 3.5 seconds before she starts fiddling with pen 3 for 7.2 seconds. The activity 
of adjusting pen 3 immediately leads to P27 rearranging the four pens in a neatly overlapping 
form, as shown in Figure 4. As this rearrangement in turn yields an acceptable solution to the 
task, it constitutes a 11.3 seconds breakthrough phase which, by definition, constitutes the 
event pivot in P27’s cognitive trajectory. 
---------------------------- 
FIGURE 4 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
After the breakthrough, we observe another tryout phase that lasts 1:24 minutes. However, 
this time she works on the assumption that the problem is a set theoretical problem where the 
pens may overlap. By repeating the same activity as in the first tryout phase (i.e. relocating 
zebras into pens), P27 now reaches a solution in tryout 2.  
In the last two phases, she first validates the solution by counting the number of zebras in 
each pen (7 seconds), before engaging in non-task-related behaviour (such as making the 
zebras stand in line) in the expiry phase (2:12 minutes). The full trajectory is visualised in 
Figure 5. 
---------------------------- 
FIGURE 5 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
Having thus identified the relevant event pivots, transition points and trajectory phases, we 
can now proceed to the two central questions in making a Cognitive Event Analysis: What 
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were the enabling conditions of P27’s achieving an acceptable solution? How did P27 solve 
the 17A problem? Pursuing an answer to these questions, we start from the primary event 
pivot. We first analyse what created the breakthrough; then we focus on a particular 
behavioural pattern (consisting of so-called “aesthetic actions”) that functions as an 
animating force for P27; finally we focus on the perceptual affordances that prompt P27 to 
reach a successful solution. 
Serendipities of Change 
The breakthrough phase is where P27 reinterprets the problem from being an arithmetic 
one to being a set theoretical one. On a material level, this reinterpretation appears as the re-
organising of the four pens into the overlapping structure shown in Figure 4. The logical 
question implied by the observation of the overlapping structure of the pens is whether this 
overlap results from a plan that is projected onto the pens (Kirsh, 2010)―i.e. the overlap is 
represented in P27’s mind before being materialised on the table―or if it emerges as a result 
of P27’s interactivity. We will examine both hypotheses in turn.  
First, if the overlaps are a result of a mental plan, then such a plan must be projected in 
toto on the environment. In that case, the projection does not depend on a series of action-
perception cycles where P27 will first move one pen, see how it works, and then move 
another pen; rather, it will proceed as a single smooth, fluent action, since the movement 
would be the result of a pre-existing intention.  
For the second hypothesis, if the overlaps are emergent and unplanned, we should expect 
three observable features of the cognitive trajectory. First, we expect that the initial 
(unintended) overlap is a serendipitous by-product of some other process, if nothing else a 
process of trying various strategies. Second, we expect a discontinuity between the first 
overlap and the subsequent overlaps, as it is unlikely that P27 produces a triple overlap 
serendipitously. Third, we expect that P27 engages in some sort of manifest observational 
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behaviour between the first and the subsequent overlaps, that is, there is an observable 
indication that she notices the overlap as an affordance for solving the problem. In other 
words, to test the two hypotheses we are prompted to investigate, first, P27’s pre-overlap 
activities and, second, indications of her observing or noticing that the initial overlap may 
yield a successful outcome of the task. 
First, we investigate how the first overlap came into being. To do so, we focus on the 
peri-pivotal zone that paves the way for an observable cognitive breakthrough. It spans the 
last 7,185 ms of the impasse and the first 500 ms of the breakthrough (see Figure 6). 
---------------------------- 
FIGURE 6 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
As stated, the peri-pivotal follows P27’s emptying the pens by piling the zebras on the table. 
She is clearly stuck and prepares to start all over―but does not know where to start. So rather 
than engaging in another trial, she adjusts the lay-out of pens, focusing on pen 3 which has a 
more oval shape. First she repositions pen 3, moving it approximately 1 cm to the right with 
her right hand (1,950 ms). Second she reshapes pen 3 (5,230 ms): she lifts it, twists it, 
stretches it, puts it down, lifts it again, compresses it and puts it down again―as shown in 
Figure 7. 
------------------------------ 
FIGURE 7 APP. HERE 
------------------------------ 
As can be observed from Figure 7, reshaping pen 3 has an unanticipated side-effect. As P27 
twists the pen with her left hand (see Fig. 7a), she causes the pen to move slightly to the right 
so that the right-most periphery of the pen overlaps with pen 4 for 240 ms. The two pens 
actually touch each other (as indicated by the red arrow on Fig. 7b) and when P27 lets go of 
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pen 3 with her right hand, the physical energy stored in the pen (due to the left hand twist) 
makes the pen slip back to the left. However, as the pipe cleaners are made of a textured 
material, a Velcro effect makes pen 3 drag pen 4 with it (see Fig. 7c). Due to this unplanned 
reconfiguration of the pens, P27’s subsequent attempts to reshape pen 3 (see Fig. 7d-7e) are 
all carried out while pen 3 is positioned over pen 4. When P27 has formed pen 3 into a 
circular shape, she puts it down, but on top of pen 4 (see Fig. 7f).  
This observation indicates that the overlap is not a result of a pre-existing plan, but rather 
an emergent feature caused by P27’s fiddling with pen 3, as well as the material properties of 
the pipe cleaners. The observation favours the non-mentalist hypothesis. But as discussed 
above, if it really is the case that P27 made the overlap by accident, we would expect to 
observe her noticing the overlap as an affordance for reaching a solution before generalising 
it to the other overlaps. Does P27 exhibit behaviour that indicates a change of attention? 
Immediately after she has put down pen 3 (see Fig. 7f), she reaches out for pen 4 with her 
right hand (see Fig 8a).  
------------------------------ 
FIGURE 8 APP. HERE 
------------------------------ 
Importantly, the movement is fast (440 ms) and directed at the rightmost point of pen 4, and 
during the movement her thumb points downwards. Had she continued this movement, she 
would have touched pen 4 with her thumb at its rightmost place and dragged it to the right in 
order to reinstate the non-overlapping order of the four separate pens. But she doesn’t. 
Immediately before her thumb reaches pen 4, she aborts the movement and moves her right 
hand to her face (see Fig. 8b), while she uses her left hand to move pen 1 into an overlap with 
pen 3 (see Fig. 8b-8c). The assumption that this 440 ms movement is in fact executed in order 
to dissolve the overlap is strengthened by the fact that on three previous occasions P27 
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dissolves such an overlap within 1 to 6 seconds (see Table 6). For illustration, Figure 9 shows 
how the first of these sequences unfold. 
----------------------------- 
TABLE 6 APP. HERE 
----------------------------- 
------------------------------ 
FIGURE 9 APP. HERE 
------------------------------ 
As P27 is folding pen 2 in the preparation phase, the loose end of one of the pipe cleaners 
“catches” pen 1 (see Fig. 9a). Pen 1 is therefore moved into P27’s working space as she pulls 
pen 2 in preparation for connecting the two pipe cleaners (see Fig. 9b). Throughout the 6.1 s 
of closing the pen, the two pens visibly overlap (see Fig. 9c), and when she puts down pen 2, 
it is placed on top of pen 1 (see Fig. 9d). As this was unintended, she immediately dissolves 
the overlap by dragging pen 1 to the left and pen 2 to the right (see Fig. 9d-9e).  
The first four overlaps are strikingly similar: a weak Velcro effect makes the two pipe 
cleaners end up in entangled states with visible overlaps. All four times P27 moves the hand 
in order to disentangle them. But the crucial difference is that only in the first three instances 
does she carry out the movement, while in the fourth instance she inhibits the action, as 
described above. What is more, not only does she inhibit dissolving the overlap, at the same 
time she makes an additional overlap (#5 in Table 6), as her left hand reaches for pen 1 which 
she lifts and places on top of pen 3 (see Fig. 8c). Furthermore, 1.2 s later P27 moves pen 2 
into an overlapping position with pen 4 (#6 in Table 6). Accordingly, 7.5 s after the 
breakthrough, she has now established the layout of pens that allow her to reach a 
solution―and indeed, 88 seconds later, the problem is solved.  
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Summarizing the analysis of the peri-pivotal sequence, we can conclude that the 
hypothesis that the solution was the result of a pre-conceived plan is highly unlikely, as we 
have observed three features that characterise a serendipity: first the accidental overlap, 
second the manifest noticing it, and third the generalisation of the overlap to the other pens. 
The most likely conclusion is that the solution was achieved through P27’s interactivity with 
the material artefacts. 
Functional aesthetics 
We have seen that the breakthrough emerged as an interaction between (a) P27’s 
engaging in non-task behaviour (i.e. reshaping pen 3); (b) her ability to notice the overlap as 
an affordance for solving the problem; and (c) the Velcro properties of the pipe cleaners. 
These three features all converge in the peri-pivotal sequence that paves the way for P27’s 
cognitive breakthrough, but each has a distinct history that can be further traced in order to 
investigate the specific cognitive trajectory. However, we will leave the materiality of the 
pipe cleaners out of consideration in this context since it is invariant throughout the cognitive 
trajectory.6 Rather we focus on P27’s action-perception cycle: her actions in the artificial lab 
environment and her picking up affordances from the lay-out of the work space. In this 
section, we focus on P27’s actions, and in the next section we turn to the perceptual 
dynamics. 
Having established that the breakthrough was enabled by P27’s reshaping pen 3, we can 
ask why she reshaped it. It is noteworthy that this action has no task-related function 
whatsoever, since the shape of a pen does not affect its “overlappability.” In particular, as this 
behaviour occurs before the breakthrough, P27 is still assuming that she is dealing with an 
arithmetic task, and from an arithmetic point of view the four enclosures could just as well be 
solid containers or painted squares: attending to the physical appearance of these are 
functionally void. We argue that this behaviour is prompted by P27’s need to homogenise the 
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different visual appearances of the pens: pen 1 is circular; pen 2 and pen 4 are egg-shaped, 
and pen 3 sticks out as an oblong oval (see Fig. 4). These differences can be traced to the 
time spent on folding the four pens. Thus, P27 spends approximately 50% more time on 
folding each of pen 1 and pen 4 than she spends on pen 2 and pen 3, and both the two quickly 
folded pens calls for additional action later in the cognitive trajectory: 2.2 seconds after being 
folded, pen 2 disintegrates due to a poorly performed fold, and P27 needs to re-connect the 
two pipe cleaners. Pen 3, however, has kept its odd appearance throughout tryout 1 and to 
this point of the cognitive trajectory.  
However, for P27 to pay attention to this difference in appearance, it is not sufficient that 
there is a visible difference; to reshape the pen, she must be moved to act upon the observed 
differences. She must identify the current state as less fit than an anticipated future state, not 
according to a task-defined criterion, but according to a non-task related criterion. That 
criterion, we hypothesise, is aesthetics: what prompts P27 to reshape the pen is a general 
tendency to impose an aesthetic order onto the physical layout of her surroundings which, in 
the relatively constrained context of the laboratory, means the working space of pipe cleaners 
and zebras. To account for this dimension of P27’s cognitive trajectory, we define an 
aesthetic action as an action that (a) transforms the physical layout of the environment in 
order to make it more ordered, and (b) has no task-related, cognitive function.  
To identify an action as aesthetic in this sense requires, first, that no task-related (or 
otherwise) explanation for the specific behaviour can be identified. Second, the action must 
be traceable to a general aesthetic inclination that functions as a behavioural determinant 
throughout the problem solving process. Were it a one-off, we would only have an observer-
dependent criterion to determine whether the layout achieved was more or less ordered for 
the participant. As for the first requirement, we have already argued that P27 has no task-
related motifs for reshaping pen 3 in the peri-pivotal sequence. It is difficult to see what else 
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P27 could gain by turning the oblong oval into a circle. Thus, this action is a good candidate 
for an aesthetic action. The second requirement can be met in two ways: one can test a given 
participant’s level of aesthetics, similar to how working memory and other cognitive 
functions can be tested; however, none were applied to the participants in the current study. 
Alternatively, one can observe if such aesthetic drives surface in other instances. If it is 
generally the case that a participant engages in behaviours that are not manifestly task-related 
and that brings about more ordered states in the visual appearance of the workspace (also in 
cases where it does not fuel the cognitive trajectory), then it suggests that aesthetics is 
precisely such a behavioural drive. In the case of P27 we observe six instances of aesthetic 
actions, as outlined in Table 7.  
---------------------------- 
TABLE 7 APP. HERE 
---------------------------- 
The first aesthetic action occurs at the very end of the first tryout phase (5:38 into the 
trajectory). P27 has for 3:30 minutes shuffled around with zebras, performing a total of 33 
moves, and now she is stuck. She sits motionless for a 15.7 seconds, passively observing the 
workspace. Then, just as she is about to resume moving the zebras, she inhibits her action and 
rather engages in the aesthetic activity of adjusting pen 3 and 4, ever so slightly (see figure 
10).  
------------------------------ 
FIGURE 10 APP. HERE 
------------------------------ 
The second incident is the serendipitous creation of the overlap already analysed in the 
previous section. The third and fourth incident occurs immediately before the transition 
between the breakthrough and the second tryout (6:12 minutes into the cognitive trajectory). 
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Here, P27 has arranged the four pens in overlaps, and she is now ready to engage in another 
try at relocating the zebras in order to solve the task. But 6 seconds before she grasps the first 
zebra (which defines the beginning of tryout 2), she attempts to smoothen the rather sharp 
bend on pen 2, just as she makes a minimal, almost unnoticeable adjustment of pen 1’s 
position. None of these actions has any visible outcome, let alone any impact on the cognitive 
trajectory. 
The last two occurrences of aesthetic actions are found in the expiry phase. By definition, 
at this stage P27 cannot engage in task-related activities (an already-solved task is hardly a 
task), and for this reason we should expect to find many aesthetic actions in the expiry phase. 
And in fact, for 74% of this phase, P27 engages in aesthetic actions.7 The sixth aesthetic 
action is rather trivial: for the last minute or so of the recording, P27 takes two pipe cleaners 
and starts folding a non-figurative figure. More significant is the fifth aesthetic action. 
Having validated the solution, she starts adjusting the zebras’ positions in each pen. This 
takes her 33.5 seconds, and Figure 11 shows the layout of zebras before and after this 
adjustment. P27’s aesthetic inclination is to stand all lying zebras on their hooves and align 
them with zebras within the same pen. Likewise, she makes groups of zebras within the same 
pen orient in the same direction. 
------------------------------ 
FIGURE 11 APP. HERE 
------------------------------ 
In conclusion, P27’s aesthetic actions function as a motor that moves her forward along her 
cognitive trajectory. Our claim is not that aesthetics per se contributes to problem solving, but 
that aesthetics lead to changes in the “lay-out of affordances” (Chemero, 2000b) that reveal 
task-relevant features of the environment. The question of aesthetics is further explored in the 
Discussion section. 
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Perceptual affordances 
In the first part of this analysis of P27’s cognitive trajectory we showed how her 
breakthrough was serendipitous in nature, as it depended on non-task behaviour in 
combination with attending to the result of this behaviour. In the second part we traced the 
behavioural component to P27’s inclination to engage in aesthetic action, and in this third 
part we investigate the dynamics of her perception and attention. In doing so we struggle with 
numerous methodological problems. First, our data do not allow us to observe what P27 
attends to because we did not equip the participants with eye-tracking equipment. Second, 
due to the single camera mounted in the ceiling we cannot even engage in conjuring a coarse-
grained picture of just what P27 looks at. However, we might occasionally deduce what she 
attends to, by observing changes in posture (e .g. when leaning over the paper, she probably 
reads the task) and in behaviour (e.g. when returning the short pipe cleaner to the pile, she has 
probably just perceived that its size does not afford folding into a pen). In other words, 
because we are forced to work with “unperceivable perception,” we will rely on more general 
behavioural observations.  
The key argument in our treatment of P27’s attention is that the serendipitous overlap 
treated above is not the first occurrence of overlapping pens. Therefore, something else than 
the overlap functions as an enabling condition for her breakthrough. Following this argument, 
we can more systematically compare how the pivotal overlap differs from the previous 
instances. These overlaps were shown in Table 6, where the pivotal overlap is #4 (highlighted 
with grey). As argued, Table 6 shows that the last three overlap configurations are 
continuous: through generalisation, overlap #4 functions as an enabling condition for overlap 
#5 and #6. However, this result merely shows that when an insight is achieved, it can be 
generalised to generate a solution. This leaves us with the more interesting question: why did 
this insight not occur with the first three overlaps? 
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First of all, we notice that these three overlaps all occur in the preparation phase. Based 
on P27’s behaviour in the first tryout phase, it is clear that her working hypothesis before the 
breakthrough is that she is working on an arithmetic problem. In other words, during the 
preparation phase she is not looking for a solution, because she has already conceived a 
solution (albeit a wrong solution) which she is trying to materialise. That situation changes in 
the impasse: now she has lost her solution and is actively seeking out options to move 
forward. In the terminology of Steffensen (2013), she engages in solution-probing, i.e. she 
“immethodically zigzag[s] along a cognitive trajectory […] in [her] search for something that 
can work as a problem solution” (Steffensen, 2013:205).8 Thus, the first three overlaps are 
not affordances for a solution, whereas the pivotal overlap is. The crucial point is that what 
on the one hand seems to be repetitions (the repeated creation of overlaps), on the other is 
“repetition without repetition” (Cowley & Nash, 2013): the behavioural pattern might be 
repetitious, but the perceptual and attentional embedding of the behaviour is significantly 
different. 
Second, it is noteworthy that the pen structure is stable during both tryout phases: the 
only time the pen appears as an action object during the 5:11 minutes of tryout is the 870 ms 
adjustment of pen 3 and 4 that was depicted in Fig. 10. This stability suggests that during 
these phases, P27 relies on a perceptual figure-ground constellation where she attends to the 
zebras as her perceptual focus, while the pens merely function as a perceptual ground for 
grouping zebras. This observation casts new light on the impasse phase immediately before 
the serendipitous overlap. As previously stated, the impasse phase lasts 25.9 seconds: first, 
P27 relocates all zebras from the pens into a pile on the middle of the table (15.2 s), then she 
observes the workspace, scratching her forehead (3.5 s), and then she reshapes pen 3 so the 
overlap with pen 4 emerges (7.2 s). We have already discussed the last 7.2 seconds as part of 
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the peri-pivotal sequence, but without relating it to the first part of the impasse. The initial 
state and the end state of these 15.2 seconds are shown in Figure 12. 
------------------------------ 
FIGURE 12 APP. HERE 
------------------------------ 
Traditionally, the problem solving literature interprets such behaviour as a resetting of the 
scene due to the participant being stuck. While definitely the case, it is not the full story. In 
P27’s case collecting the zebras in a pile has perceptual implications, because it forces her to 
execute a figure-ground inversion, making the ground-so-far (i.e. the pens) her new figure. 
Assuming that this figure-ground inversion is an enabling condition for the aesthetic action of 
reshaping pen 3 is in consonance with other findings in the literature. Thus, Vartanian and 
colleagues (Vartanian, 2009; Vartanian, Martindale, & Kwiatkowski, 2003, 2007; Vartanian, 
Martindale, & Matthews, 2009) have developed Martindale’s (1999) hypothesis that   
 
In earlier phases of problem solving when the problem is relatively ill-defined, 
creative people are more likely to defocus attention. This tendency makes the central 
task more susceptible to interference by seemingly irrelevant information, some of 
which may provide the building blocks for solutions.  […] In later stages of problem 
solving when creative people are verifying developed ideas, performance will benefit 
through the inhibition of irrelevant stimuli and added focus on the task. This 
narrowing of attention speeds up processing on the task. (Vartanian et al., 2007:1471) 
 
A figure-ground inversion evidently implies defocused attention, and P27’s reengagement 
with the zebras in the second tryout phase is consonant with Vartanian et al.’s description of 
participants’ “narrowing of attention.” Changes in attention thus also work as an enabling 
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condition for P27’s successful solution in the 17 Animals task, and hence we can explain why 
the first three overlaps did not lead to an insight: P27 did not have the sufficient attention to 
the pens as a resource for solving the problem. 
Hitherto, we have discussed the aesthetic actions that fuel P27 on her cognitive trajectory 
and the dynamics that attune her attention to the pivotal overlap as two necessary, but 
separate conditions for achieving a solution. However, these two features are closely 
connected. As can be seen from Table 8, 4 out of 6 aesthetic actions are actually preceded by 
significant phases where P27 motionlessly observe the workspace.  
----------------------------- 
TABLE 8 APP. HERE 
----------------------------- 
This is noteworthy because “being stuck” is traditionally connected with being in a state of 
impasse. For instance, Ohlsson suggests that “behaviorally, impasses are characterized by the 
cessation of problem solving activity” (Ohlsson, 1992). If so, the sheer inactivity of these 
periods suggests that P27 is indeed stuck. For an illustrative example, Figure 10a and 10c 
show the longest observation phase (15.7 s) at its onset and at its end. She has hardly moved 
for this long period. This pattern of aesthetic actions being preceded by periods of motionless 
observation indicates P27’s general tendency to perform aesthetic actions when she does not 
know what else to do. On the other hand, it is not the case that all observation periods are 
followed by an aesthetic actions, as is shown in Figure 13. 
------------------------------ 
FIGURE 13 APP. HERE 
------------------------------ 
But significantly, all observation phases that are not followed by an aesthetic action occur in 
a tryout phase, where P27 is stuck on another level: thus, within these phases she knows 
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(correctly or incorrectly) that she has to move a zebra to calibrate the group size, but she does 
not know which zebra to move where. In contrast, in the non-tryout phases she does not know 
what to do altogether, since the move-a-zebra strategy has failed. Hence, it is hardly 
surprising that the pattern of observation-aesthetic action cluster around the main phase 
transitions in P27’s cognitive trajectory: at the beginning of the impasse phase, just before the 
breakthrough and at the beginning of the expiry phase. Evidently, describing P27 as being 
stuck refers to an actional level, but it seems reasonable to assume that actional paralysis 
prompts a stronger emphasis on perception. 
Summarizing these insights on P27’s attentional dynamics, we can conclude that the 
comparison between the initial overlaps and the pivotal overlap has shown that in order to 
perceive the overlap as an affordance for a solution, P27 first needs to realize that her initial 
assumption about the task does not work; second that she needs to attend to the pens, not as 
mere background, but as her focus of attention. Both these preconditions are met in and after 
the impasse phase. 
Discussion 
We dedicate our discussion to three topics: first, we discuss what the case of P27 has 
provided in terms of our understanding of problem solving; second, we reflect on the 
methodological implications of Cognitive Event Analysis; and third, we suggest a new 
perspective on the perennial debate between computationalists and ecological psychologists, 
namely on the question of the nature of representations.  
Case Study Implications 
The starting theoretical assumption of this article is that the embodiment of the agent 
matters, and hence that cognition depends on agent-environment dynamics (Chemero, 2011). 
In this first part of the discussion, we reflect on the three central aspects of the case study. 
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First, we claimed in the analysis that the specific cognitive trajectory depends on the 
material properties of the set-up, primarily the Velcro-like pipe cleaners, but potentially also 
the properties of the animal figurines. If so, the impact of different material properties can be 
tested experimentally. Thus, one can hypothesise that a number of material parameters 
determine the outcome of the experiment: pens can be formed with pieces of varying length, 
height, weight, rigidity, and adhesiveness; they can even be formed by pre-given surfaces 
(e.g. disks or plates) in different shape, size, opacity, and adhesiveness; likewise, animal 
figurines and working space can vary in size, weight, shape, etc. While such considerations 
allow for experimentally testing whether one material configuration prompts a higher success 
rate than another, it would be even more promising to investigate how success depends on, 
not the artefacts per se, but by the relation between agent and artefact. This argument 
parallels Anderson’s (2014:172-175) discussion of how human agents measure artefacts, not 
in terms of weight and size, but, for instance, in terms of their throwability. Likewise, from 
an ecological point of view, we would not expect any material configuration to be superior to 
all others, but we would expect an optimum for overlappability, depending on material 
parameters of the pens (and the work space) and the bodily properties of the agent.  
Second, in the analysis we traced the serendipitous creation of the overlap to P27’s 
inclination to perform aesthetic actions. At first sight, the importance of this observation is 
that it illustrates the width and depth of the action repertoire from which a solution 
eventuates. Accordingly, one would not be surprised to find a successful participant who 
depended on, not aesthetic actions, but the creation of chaos, e.g. by randomly shuffling pens 
and animals on the work space (cf. Kirsh, 2015). After all, faced with the impasse, the 
important thing is to avoid doing nothing. However, we suggest reconsidering this result on a 
deeper level. Thus, while mentalist models focus on an idealised mapping of the 
representational changes necessary to reach a solution, an ecological approach further asks, 
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what drives the cognitive agent through the territory thus mapped. Mentalist cognitive 
science rests on a disembodied model where a virtual agent moves through a virtual problem 
space. In such a model, movement (i.e. representational restructuring) is cheap: the agent 
needs no incentive to act, as long as the cognitive task is unresolved. In contrast, an 
ecological approach dismisses the assumption that the context for human action is a flat 
problem space, exclusively defined in terms of task-defined problem properties. Rather, it 
acknowledges that human agents are motivated by other drives and inclinations. For P27, 
aesthetics is such a drive, and it impacts on her cognitive trajectory by creating task-unrelated 
changes that reveal task-relevant affordances. Hence, vital aspects of the cognitive trajectory 
would be missed if we ignored the full ecological situation and only focused on an (observer-
dependent) subset of the situation, defined by (what the cognitive psychologist sees as) “the 
problem.” 
Finally, in our analysis of P27’s cognitive trajectory, we argued that the identification 
of a cue as the anchor to a cognitive event is not predicated on its physical feature 
independent of the problem solving trajectory wrought through interactivity. Thus, if it was 
the mere physical overlap of pens that brought forth the breakthrough, P27 would have 
solved the problem five minutes after the two-minute mark when she accidentally created the 
first overlap. Obviously, there is an important lesson to be learnt about the nature of 
perception. As the Gestalt theorists noticed nearly a century ago, perception is not a result of 
sensation, but a result of how sensory stimuli are synthesised with conceptual anticipations; 
or in Neisser’s succinct terms, “perception is basically a constructive act rather than a 
receptive or simply analytic one” (Neisser, 1967:94), and “the mechanisms of visual 
imagination are continuous with those of visual perception” (Neisser, 1967:95). As P27 
imagines, as it were, a workspace laid out for solving an arithmetic task, she does not notice 
the affordances for solving the tacit set theoretical task. On the one hand, this observation 
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emphasises the importance of interactivity, because it shows that we cannot make valid 
inferences from the configuration of artefacts, independently on how the agent (perceptually 
and actionally) engages with it. On the other hand, the very same observation can lead one to 
prefer a representational model to an interactivity-based model, because there so obviously is 
a discrepancy between what there is to see and what P27 actually sees. One could argue, as 
indeed Ohlsson (2011) does, that any such discrepancy between the external physical reality 
and experienced reality (or imagined experience) is a proof of representations. We will return 
to this question. 
Methodological Implications 
Our starting point for a methodological reflection on Cognitive Event Analysis is the 
question: can qualitative methods add anything at all to a cognitive psychology built on 
controlled experiments and nomothetic inferences? We believe it can. But a caveat is in 
place: as we in this article propose a qualitative method for doing single-case studies, we are 
obliged to discuss the generalizability and the danger of “hasty generalisations” (Walton, 
1999) and “just so” explanations. On this question, we see ourselves as being in the same 
situation as Anzai and Simon (1979) when they embarked on their single-case study of the 
learner solving the Tower of Hanoi: 
 
It may be objected that a general psychological theory cannot be supported by a single 
case. One swallow does not make a summer, but one swallow does prove the existence 
of swallows. And careful dissection of even one swallow may provide a great deal of 
reliable information about swallow anatomy. Although the generality of the theory we 
have constructed remains to be tested, we undertook to model accurately the learning 
mechanisms that we observed in the behavior of our single human subject, modelling 
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them in such a way that their applicability would not be limited to the specific task 
environment […] in which we discovered them. (Anzai & Simon, 1979:136) 
 
Like Anzai and Simon, we have not provided a general theory of problem solving; the 
serendipitous character of problem solving cannot be generalised; and the specific 
suggestions about, for instance, aesthetic actions and perceptual figure-ground inversion 
remain to be tested.  
However, the current study does provide us with lines of inquiry beyond the insights 
provided by the single-case study. Thus, while cognitive psychology indeed has developed 
robust methods for meticulously testing hypotheses, it is strikingly silent on how to generate 
hypotheses. For instance, a search on PsycINFO gives 1979 hits for “test(ing) or evaluat(ing) 
hypothesis/-es” within cognitive psychology, but only 149 hits for “generat(ing), creat(ing) or 
produc(ing) hypothesis/-es” within this field.9 Since the field invests its scientific validity in 
experimental testing, the development of scrupulously controlled methods for generating 
hypotheses has been neglected. As a result, by and large, hypotheses are either deduced from 
extant theories or derived from anecdotal observation or philosophical speculation.  
With CEA we have provided a method that is neither anecdotal nor speculative, but a 
manifestly data-driven, qualitative method. Accordingly, based on the scrutiny of P27, one 
can investigate a number of dimensions of the 17A problem by formulating such hypotheses 
as: (a) due to the interactivity cycles between participant and the material layout of the 
problem, solution rates can be manipulated by changing the materiality of the pens (i.e. as 
pieces of varying length, height, weight, rigidity, and adhesiveness, or as surfaces of different 
shape, size, opacity, and adhesiveness); and (b) for each of these dimensions there is an 
optimum value that maximises solution rates. Further, having dismissed the assumption that 
the context for human action is a flat problem space, this article also suggests the hypothesis 
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that (c) across contexts, cognitive agents have emotional drives (including aesthetic 
inclinations) that prompt them to engage in specific behavioural patterns, irrespective of the 
concrete task. Finally, based on the proposed figure-ground inversion, we suggest the 
hypothesis that (d) cueing works by perturbing the agent into altering his/her perceptual 
dynamics, e.g. through figure-ground inversion. 
CEA’s focus on embodied interactivity also provides experimentalists with new ways 
of coping with two problems that arise with experimental methods: the outlier problem and 
the granularity problem. According to the standard work on statistical outliers (Barnett & 
Lewis, 1994), an outlier is a data point inconsistent with the overall data set. Traditionally, 
outliers are seen as a source of data contamination that masks otherwise valid tendencies, and 
for this reason, they are done away with by the application of various statistical methods. 
However, while outliers may be caused by measurement or performance errors, they may just 
as well be caused by the inherent variability in the data set. Outliers that are not due to 
measurement or performance errors, constitute a challenge to models that eliminate inherent 
variability, because such models fail to explain manifest cognitive performances. Outliers 
may be strange, peculiar, odd, or anomalous—but they still manifest behaviour and instances 
of cognition, and they must be described as such. If a given performance pattern can be 
produced by human cognition, then our cognitive theories must be able to cope with it. If our 
overall models do not provide an explanation, auxiliary models must be generated through 
meticulous description of what actually happens in the outlier cases. CEA is a method for 
constructing such models which can be tested through further experiments. 
The granularity problem is similar to the outlier problem. Any experimental setting 
depends on a series of measurements that generate one or more data points for each point in 
time. The number of data points depends on the measurement granularity. In the extreme 
case, one finds explanatory models based on merely two measurements: an initial 
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measurement (problem unsolved at t1) and a final measurement (problem solved or unsolved 
at t2). For instance, a model of cognitive extension can be based on measurements of 
participants solving a task X (e.g. solving the 17A problem) in condition Y (e.g. using 
artefacts), but not in Condition Z (e.g. using pen and paper). Obviously, such methods cannot 
show how subjects solved the problem or whether they did it in different ways or the same 
way. As Van Orden and colleagues point out, “one cannot resolve systematic variation on 
timescales faster than the pace of measurement. The timescale of data collection is too 
sparsely paced to accurately gauge variation on faster timescales” (Van Orden, Holden, & 
Turvey, 2003:338). Loosely speaking, on the timescale of measurement, one can show ‘that 
P1 solved X’—but in order to show ‘how P1 solved X’, one needs more fine-grained 
measurements. Evidently, this argument is valid irrespective of measurement granularity. 
Thus more fine-grained measurements may show ‘that P1 did Q to solve X’, but they do not 
show ‘how P1 did Q to solve X’. For instance, given a less fine-grained method, we might 
have shown that P27 solved the 17A problem by serendipity, but not how that serendipity 
was brought forth.  
No method can solve the granularity problem, as no method can gauge faster-than-
measurement variations. But different methods have different granularities, and their 
measurement granularity is limited by three factors: (1) the unit of analysis: for instance, the 
verbal protocol of Anzai and Simon (1979) cannot show variability within a single protocol 
statement; (2) annotation density: for instance, coding and measurement procedures can be 
performed as sparsely or as densely as one is up to; and (3) technical constraints: for instance, 
a standard video file format has a frame frequency on 24 Hz. This corresponds to a 
measurement interval on app. 40 ms which thus defines the measurement granularity. CEA is 
neither limited by pre-defined units of analysis, nor by a fixed interval density. As such it can 
for each that-observation generate substantiated how-observations, all the way down to a 40 
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ms granularity. Therefore, CEA generates observations and hypotheses that would otherwise 
be ignored or overseen by other methods.  
In conclusion, CEA does more than supplement the well-established stock of 
quantitative methods in cognitive psychology. It is a method capable of testing hypotheses 
against single cases, and furthermore it can zoom in on cognitive events on a very fine-
grained level. Depending on the research agenda, CEA can, in combination with quantitative 
methods, serve the purpose of generating hypotheses by scrutinizing statistical outliers and 
fine-grained between-measurement phenomena. Or CEA can stand alone as a qualitative 
method on a par with extant qualitative methods, such as (coded) verbal or video protocol 
analyses and cognitive ethnography (Ormerod & Ball, 2010). 
Theoretical Implications 
We dedicate this last part of the discussion to the question of how our results contribute 
to the perennial debate on representations. Given the premise that problem solving follows a 
trajectory from a state where the agent has a problem to a later state where the problem is 
(dis)solved, the question is: does problem solving require representational restructuring 
(Ohlsson, 2011), or can it proceed on the basis of changes in the world? We have observed 
how a cognitive agent acts on the world, manipulates artefacts, models aspects of reality, and 
re-arranges physical features, but does this observable interactivity result from, catalyse, or 
constitute problem solving?  
A die-hard mentalist would opt for the result from-interpretation, arguing that any overt 
behaviour must result from a pre-existing mental plan or program: “an explanation of an 
observed behavior of the organism is provided by a program of primitive information 
processes that generates this behavior” (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958:151). In contrast, a 
convinced anti-representationalist (Chemero, 2000a, 2011) would trace problem solving to 
the embodied-ecological dynamics of action-perception cycles, i.e. interactivity constitutes 
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problem solving. In-between, one finds the cueing-based view that representational 
restructuring must somehow be involved in problem solving, and therefore interactivity only 
works because it catalyses representational changes. Ceteris paribus, our data are compatible 
with all three models, because the data underdetermine the three competing theories 
(Stanford, 2013): observational data cannot verify or falsify theoretical claims of 
representational and computational processes in a mental realm, because such theoretical 
claims are “not at all concerned with the physical structures that allow this symbolization, nor 
with any properties of the memories and symbols other than those it explicitly states” (Newell 
et al., 1958:151).  
Although our data and our approach were not designed to disentangle these different 
accounts, they may still throw some light on the controversy. We start from the observation 
that the criterion for determining whether a problem has been solved, does not pertain to the 
mental realm, since evidence of successful problem solving is mined from the world: what is 
measured is physical and behavioural evidence. The claim that representational restructuring 
has taken place builds on the warrant that such behaviour requires (the enaction of) mental 
representations. However, proponents of representational models have the burden of proof: as 
they solve the problem of how an agent connects action and perception by introducing a 
representational realm, they are obliged to explain how this realm interacts with the 
behavioural realm of the agent. This challenge was posed by Gilbert Ryle half a century ago, 
but still unresolved: 
 
[…] the postulated interactions between the workings of the mind and the movements 
of the hand are acknowledged to be completely mysterious. Enjoying neither the 
supposed status of the mental, nor the supposed status of the physical, these interactions 
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cannot be expected to obey either the known laws of physics, or the still to be 
discovered laws of psychology. (Ryle, 1949:52) 
 
If one accepts that the burden of proof lies with the proponents of mentalism, the strategy 
to lift the burden is to argue that a non-representational model cannot account for all data. For 
instance, in the P27 case, the fact that she so persistently sticks to an arithmetic interpretation 
for the first ca. 7 minutes of the cognitive trajectory suggests that she must have some sort of 
a mental representation of the problem. Again, our data cannot falsify such a claim. But the 
same effect can be accounted for by the non-representational model that has developed in the 
phenomenological tradition, in particular Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) concept of the habitual 
body:   
 
On the basis of past experience, I have learned that doorknobs are to be turned. This 
‘knowledge’ has sedimentated into my habitual body. While learning to play the 
piano, or to dance, I am intensely focused on what I am doing, and subsequently, this 
ability to play or to dance sedimentates into an habitual disposition. (Flynn, 2011) 
 
In a literate community, interacting with written texts (and tasks in psychological 
experiments) has the same habitual status as turning the doorknob, playing the piano, and 
dancing. We enact and embody a habitually defined way of relating to such tasks, and thus 
our habitual body makes us follow a distinct line of action. To the mentalist, this automaticity 
is the proof of an internal plan, but this mentalist interpretation does not follow from 
empirical data, but from a deep-rooted mentalist presupposition, as discussed above. To 
exemplify, Luchins’s (1942) water jug experiments show that relying on the habitual body is 
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cognitively simpler than identifying a new method, although that new method may count as 
simpler to the mentalist experimenter who articulates it in an abstract problem space. 
Interestingly, invoking habituality prompts us to specify the nature of the ecological 
position that interactivity constitutes problem solving: this position does not imply that 
perception and action are connected directly (i.e. unmediated by intra-organismic dynamics), 
as such a model leaves no room for P27’s attentional change and problem reinterpretation. 
Crucially, in the ecological model, the world is not enough: cognition depends on  “the deep 
complementarity between the inner and the outer and between the neural and the bodily” 
(Clark, 2008:153), and it thus reflects a dynamic transactional agent-environment coupling 
which connects knowledge and performance: 
 
What we do depends on (follows from, is motivated by, is shaped by, is partially 
explained by) what we know and think; and what we know and think depends on 
(follows from, is motivated by, is shaped by, is partially explained by) what we do. 
Knowledge and practice are in this sense intertwined and coconstructing. (Anderson, 
2014:199-200) 
 
The exact nature of the inner pole of this complementarity is a matter of debate, to be sure. 
But as Anderson continues, even if the inner pole is representational in nature, “it is time to 
admit that simply discovering a representation in a cognitive system tells us virtually nothing 
about the nature of the underlying architecture in which the representation plays a role” 
(Anderson, 2014:201).  
In this article, we have argued that interactivity is the force that weaves the emergent 
and transactional properties of thinking.10 Our claim is that it is worthwhile to pursue a 
research agenda in problem solving psychology where the focus is on the relational 
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oscillations between habitual bodies and environments.11 The notion of interactivity as 
“sense-saturated coordination that contributes to human action” (Steffensen, 2013:196) 
captures these dynamics because it emphasises the oscillating relations (“coordination”) 
between agent and environment, the habituality of these dynamics (“the sense-saturation”), 
and the teleological dimension of action. The main difference between Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological approach and an interactivity-based one is that the former limits 
habituality to the body, whereas the latter find patterns of habituality distributed all over the 
extended human ecology (Steffensen, 2011), including cognitive artefacts. In fact, it is such 
patterns of distributed habituality that makes the human agent more than a mere organismic 
agent, but crucially a sense-making creature that weaves performance and knowledge: 
 
For in the end, the human agent is both a doer and a knower, and we can accept the 
point that our cognitive architecture is organized such that we generally know in order 
to do, and still recognize that the relative importance of doing, knowing how, and 
knowing that will vary with the skill to be explained as well as across time and 
circumstance. (Anderson, 2014:201) 
 
Conclusion 
An ecological, interactivity-based approach to problem solving may pave the wave to an 
ecological understanding of the cognitive processes in problem solving. In order to study 
problem solving under laboratory conditions, real-world cognitive ecosystems must be scaled 
down, so problems are presented to participants in a manner that permits the manipulation 
and re-arrangement of the elements configuring the problem. Eliminating interactivity for the 
sake of methodological rigour produces a distorted window onto problem solving, and the 
resulting science is fundamentally misaligned with how humans think outside the 
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psychologists’ laboratory. The contingent spatio-temporal itinerary must be recorded and 
analysed to trace the genesis of insight.  
A triangulation of quantitative and qualitative analyses can identify recurrent patterns of 
behaviour that help explain (and predict) why some participants solve a problem, others don’t 
and provide a rich source for generating testable hypotheses about aspects of the agents and 
the ecosystems within which they are embedded. An ecological science of problem solving, 
supported by an analytic tool such as the Cognitive Event Analysis, is in a good position to 
explain insight. Ormerod and Ball (2010) argue that qualitative methods mainly supplement 
experimental methods because they capture otherwise elusive phenomena, such as cognitive 
processes over longer periods of time,  situated cognition, distributed cognitive systems, and 
technological interfaces. However, CEA does more than widen the scope of cognitive 
psychology; its main value comes from its focusing on “the glue of cognition” (Kirsh, 
2006:250), i.e. the fast, small-scale interactivity that couples the organism to its environment. 
CEA thus not merely applies to phenomena that are less adequately captured with 
experimental methods; it also sheds new light on this type of data by generalising across real-
life and laboratory settings. 
Obviously, this article is merely the tip of the iceberg in that respect. Given its single-
case design, it proves nothing; however, it may generate questions, and it may disprove 
extant hypotheses on problem solving. For instance, a general theory of problem solving must 
be sufficiently broad to take the possibility of serendipitous manipulation into account. With 
CEA we have provided a method for testing hypotheses against single cases of what agents 
actually do, as they engage in a given cognitive activity. While fine-grained qualitative 
analyses of agent-environment interactivity still has to stand the test of time, the novelty of 
the questions asked in this context is indicative of the potential for this approach. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Cognitive Event Analysis: five steps 
Procedure Description Example from 17A 
Cognitive Event 
Identification 
Identification of a cognitive event, 
typically an organism-initiated change 
in the layout of affordances in the 
organism-environment system, in a 
video record of a naturalistic or 
experimental data set. The event may be 
defined from an observer’s or a 
participant’s point of view 
The behavioural process 
through which P27 comes to 
see the 17A problem as a set 
theoretical problem by over-
coming the impasse of 
seeing the problem as an 
arithmetic problem 
Event Pivot 
Identification 
Identification of the critical transition 
point(s) without which the cognitive 
event would not be this specific kind of 
event 
The point in time where P27 
observes that a pen overlap 
is an affordance for solving 
the 17A problem 
Data Annotation   Segmentation and annotation of (peri-
pivotal) video sequence, using multiple 
domains and levels, with or without a 
constrained set of annotation values 
The 13 levels listed in Table 
2; the 1291 annotations of 
P27’s cognitive trajectory 
Cognitive Trajectory 
Segmentation 
Segmentation of video sequence into 
functionally and/or behaviourally 
defined phases  
The seven phases of P27’s 
trajectory: preparation, 
tryout, impasse, tryout, 
validation and expiry 
Cognitive Trajectory 
Analysis 
Analysis of how specific segments of 
the cognitive trajectory (particularly the 
event pivot) are enabled by preceding 
segment and behavioural tendencies 
P27’s observation that the 
serendipitous overlap of 
pens—caused by her drive 
to organize the work space 
more aesthetically—may be 
part of the solution 
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Table 2 
Coding categories 
Coding category 
(domain and level) 
Nature of coding category # of annotations  
for P27 
Participant Behaviour      
 Activity Constrained category: activity types (see table 3)  22  
 Activity object Constrained category: observed objects  22  
 Action Constrained category: action types (see table 4)  147  
 Action object Constrained category: observed objects  147  
 Left Hand Act Unconstrained category: act + object  318  
 Right Hand Act Unconstrained category: act + object  374  
Zebra distribution     
 Hand-held Constrained category: number of zebras, 0-17  123  
 Zebra pile Constrained category: number of zebras, 0-17  32  
 Pen 1 Constrained category: number of zebras, 0-17  25  
 Pen 2 Constrained category: number of zebras, 0-17  27  
 Pen 3 Constrained category: number of zebras, 0-17  23  
 Pen 4 Constrained category: number of zebras, 0-17  25  
Pen structure     
 Pen structure Binary category: absence/presence of overlap; 
indication of where the overlap is 
 6  
Total number of annotations  1291   
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Table 3 
Activity categories 
Activity Object of activity Definition 
Adjust Pen, zebras Minor modification of an object’s shape, orientation 
or position 
Arrange PC, pen, zebras, 
zebra pile 
 
Modification of the position of an object (or a cluster 
of objects), in relation to the work space or vis-à-vis 
other objects 
Count Zebra, finger Enumeration of concrete or virtual objects 
Fold Pen, PC Selection and transformation of PC into enclosure 
(pen) 
Observe Work space Non-invasive orientation to objects (or clusters of 
objects) 
Read Paper Orientation to a semiotic representation of task 
Relocate Zebra Modification of the position of an object (or a cluster 
of objects) which constitutes a task-defined change  
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Table 4 
Action categories 
Action Object(s) of 
action 
 Definition 
Abort Movement Abrupt disruption of movement during a relocation of an 
object, and subsequent return to the object’s first position 
Adjust Pen, zebra Minor modification of an object’s shape, orientation or 
position 
Arrange PC, pen, zebras, 
zebra pile 
Modification of the position of an object (or a cluster of 
objects) 
Close PC Jointing of a single PC (or structure of PCs) in order to create 
an enclosure (pen) 
Connect PC Jointing of two or more PCs into one structure 
Correct Glasses Minor modification of the position of a task-unrelated object 
Count Zebras, fingers Enumeration of concrete or virtual objects 
Inhibit Move Abrupt disruption of movement during a participants reaching 
out for an object 
Observe Work space Non-invasive orientation to objects (or clusters of objects) 
Place Zebra Modification of the position of an object (or a cluster of 
objects) which constitutes a task-defined change, and where 
the object’s initial position is the zebra pile and the final 
position a pen  
Read Paper Orientation to a semiotic representation of task 
Relocate Zebra Modification of the position of an object (or a cluster of 
objects) which constitutes a task-defined change  
Search Work space Non-invasive orientation to objects (or clusters of objects) 
accompanied by multiple abrupt disruption of movements 
(abortions) 
Take PC Retrieval of one or more objects from a larger grouping of 
similar objects 
Touch Face  
Hands 
Establishing contact between hand(s) and task-unrelated 
objects, including parts of the participants body 
Turn Paper Modification of an object’s orientation on a vertical or 
horizontal axis 
Withdraw Hands 
Body 
Postural change that entails an increase in distance between 
participant and work space 
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Table 5 
P27’s cognitive trajectory in seven phases 
Cognitive 
trajectory 
Time Duration Functional definitions Behavioural 
definitions 
Preparation -365,000 –
 -252,800 
112,200 ms = 
1:52 minutes 
Reads task and folds 
four pens 
Read + paper 
Fold + pen 
Arrange + PC 
Arrange + pen 1-4 
Arrange + zebra pile 
Tryout 1  -252,800 –
 -25,900 
226,900 ms = 
3:47 minutes 
Places zebras to reach 
arithmetic solution 
Relocate + zebras (into 
pen) 
Impasse -25,900  
– 0 
25,900 ms = 
0:26 minutes 
Gets stuck; resets the 
task by returning zebras 
to pile 
Relocate + zebras (into 
zebra pile) 
Observe + work space 
Adjust + pen 3 (shape) 
Breakthrough 
(event pivot) 
0 – 11,300 11,300 ms = 
0:11 minutes 
Accidentally creates 
and notices overlap 
between pens 
Arrange + pen 1-4 
Tryout 2 11,300 – 
95,000 
83,700 ms = 
1:24 minutes 
Places zebras to reach 
set theoretical solution 
Relocate + zebras (into 
pen) 
Validation 95,000 – 
101,800 
6,800 ms = 
0:07 minutes 
Counts zebras to 
confirm that a solution 
has been reached 
Count + zebras 
Expiry 101,800 – 
233,300 
131,500 ms = 
2:12 minutes 
Non-task activities: 
adjusts zebras to make 
the model look 
“pretty”; folds PCs into 
figurine 
Observe + work space 
Adjust + zebras 
Observe + work space 
Fold + PC-figure 
Note. Of all 14 behavioural definitions, only one appears in two different segments of the 
cognitive trajectory, namely arrange pen 1-4 which both occurs in the preparation phase and 
in the breakthrough. This observation emphasises the cyclical nature of P27’s cognitive 
trajectory, as the breakthrough, so to speak, functions as a second preparation phase. 
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Table 6 
Pen overlaps in P27’s cognitive trajectory 
# Pens Phase of cognitive 
trajectory 
Overlap onset 
time 
Overlap end 
time 
Duration (ms) 
1 1 and 2 Preparation phase -318,700 -312,600 6,100 
2 2 and 4 Preparation phase -275,600 -274,300 1,300 
3 2 and 4 Preparation phase -273,250 -272,250 1,000 
4 3 and 4 Impasse 
| 
Expiry 
-4,175 238,475 242,650 
5 1 and 3 Breakthrough 
| 
Expiry 
925 238,475 237,550 
6 2 and 4 Breakthrough 
| 
Expiry 
4,250 238,475 234,225 
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Table 7 
Aesthetic actions in P27’s cognitive trajectory 
# Type Beginning 
time 
Duration (ms) Description 
1 Aesthetic -26,632 875 P27 slightly adjusts the position of 
pen 3 and pen 4 
2 Aesthetic -7,050 7,050 P27 reshapes pen 3 and places it in 
an overlap with pen 4 
3 Aesthetic 7,675 1,850 P27 attempts to smoothen a sharp 
bend in pen 2 
4 Aesthetic 9,525 1,925 P27 makes a minimal adjustment of 
pen 1’s position  
5 Aesthetic 122,100 33,525 P27 adjusts all zebras in the pens to 
achieve a more ordered arrangement 
6 Aesthetic 170,000 68,075 P27 takes two pipe cleaners and 
folds a three-dimensional figure 
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Table 8 
Aesthetic actions and observation periods in P27’s cognitive trajectory 
# Type Aesthetic action 
beginning time 
Observation 
duration (ms) 
Observation 
end time 
Latency from 
observation to 
aesthetic 
action (ms) 
1 Aesthetic -26,625 15,700 -27,800 (1,175) 
2 Aesthetic -7,050 3,475 -7,050 0 
3 Aesthetic 7,675 No preceding observation 
4 Aesthetic 9,525 No preceding observation 
5 Aesthetic 122,100 11,275 122,025 75 
6 Aesthetic 170,975 15,325 170,975 0 
Note. The aesthetic actions are described in detail in Table 7. The latency before aesthetic 
action #1 is due to a short sequence coded as “inhibits move,” i.e. a sequence where P27 
reaches out for a pen or a zebra, but inhibits the motion before it reaches its destination. As a 
continuation of the long observation phase, these 1.5 seconds are observational in nature, but 
they are not completely motionless. 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Two set theoretical solutions to 17A. An odd number of zebras must be placed in 
one or more overlapping areas. 
 
Figure 2. The lay-out of the experiment. From left to right, the participant has access to a pile 
of pipe cleaners, a pile of 17 zebra figures, and a written task instruction. Bottom left, an 
enlarged picture of a single zebra figure (a paper clip) is inserted. 
 
Figure 3. Default pen structure. Four pens are arranged in a two times two matrix. The 
numbers refer to the numbering of pens in this paper which for convenience corresponds to 
the reading direction in texts written in Latin letters, i.e. from left to right, and from top to 
bottom. Numbers assigned to pens do not change, even if the order of pens varies during the 
task. 
   
Figure 4. Overcoming the impasse. In the breakthrough phase, P27 re-arranges the pens so 
that they overlap. The initial overlap (4a) has been generalised in order to create three 
overlaps. 
 
Figure 5. P27’s cognitive trajectory. The whole event lasts app. 10 minutes. Unfilled triangles 
mark phase transitions; filled triangle the two event pivots. 
 
Figure 6. The peri-pivotal sequence. The two rows of black boxes show the left hand (top 
row) and the right hand (bottom row); arrows within these boxes indicate that the pen is being 
lifted or lowered. The light grey boxes indicate the action; the dark grey arrows point to two 
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salient moments in the cognitive trajectory. (“R: p. 4” in the penultimate box in the bottom 
row is an abbreviation for: “Reach: pen 4.”)  
 
Figure 7. The peri-pivotal sequence. Green arrows indicate hand movements; red arrows 
indicate contact between two pens; the yellow orientation lines indicate pen movements in 
relation to a fixed point at the working table. 
 
Figure 8. Inhibiting the dissolution of the overlap. Green arrows indicate hand movements. 
 
Figure 9. An early overlap in the preparation phase. Green arrows indicate hand movements; 
red arrows indicate contact points between two pens; the yellow orientation lines indicate pen 
movements in relation to a fixed point at the working table. 
 
Figure 10. Aesthetic actions at the end of tryout 1. P27 has just relocated the last zebra (in 
pen 4), and now sits motionless for 15.7 seconds. The lapse between 10a and 10b is 8.5 
seconds, and from 10b to 10c is 6.6 seconds. 1.6 seconds later, P27 seems to resume her 
activity of moving the zebras, as she reaches for a zebra, at least with her left hand, possibly 
also with her right hand (10d). However, she aborts this movement by moving her hands 
outwards (10e) where she grasps the two pens and moves both slightly upwards (10f). Green 
arrows indicate hand movements; the yellow orientation lines indicate pen movements in 
relation to a fixed line across at the working table. 
 
Figure 11. Aesthetic action after the validation phase. P27 has achieved and validated a 
solution (11a). 20 seconds later she adjusts the zebras’ positions in the pens, so that they 
stand in a more ordered, symmetric pattern (11b). 
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Figure 12. Figure-ground inversion in the impasse phase. Having distributed and relocated all 
zebras during the 3:47 minutes of the first tryout phase, P27 is stuck (12a). During a 15.2 
seconds sequence, she swiftly removes all zebras from the pens, collecting them in a pile on 
the middle of the table (12b). 
 
Figure 13. P27’s cognitive trajectory. Aesthetic actions are marked with red; immobility 
phases are marked with yellow. The black and yellow area at the beginning of the impasse 
marks an inhibition of a movement: it is observational in nature, but is not completely 
motionless. 
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Notes 
1 An inoperable tumour can be destroyed with a laser beam of a sufficient intensity, but at 
that intensity the laser would also destroys healthy tissue. The ‘solution’ involves converging 
multiple lower intensity laser beams onto the tumour. 
2 The distributed cognitive system is further discussed in Steffensen (2013):201-203. 
3 Steffensen (2013:200) only mentions the first and the fifth phase, while the other three are implicit in his 
analysis. 
4 Gaze is an exception, as it is often possible to define a constrained list of gaze directions or 
objects for a participant.  
5 These two event pivots also underlie the distinction between solvers, partial solvers and 
non-solvers in Vallée-Tourangeau et al. (2015): a solver is a participant that achieve both the 
primary and the secondary event pivot; a partial solver reaches the primary event pivot, but 
not the secondary; and a non-solvers misses both pivots. Partial solvers enact a conceptual 
restructuring at the primary event pivot without reaching a solution at the secondary event 
pivot, because they don’t see how the set theoretical problem is to be solved. 
6 Several studies have been produced in order to investigate how material features affect 
problem-solving processes, most notably by comparing a “material” model-based condition 
with an “immaterial” pen-and-paper condition (Fioratou & Cowley, 2009; Vallée-
Tourangeau, 2013; Vallée-Tourangeau et al., 2011). However, such dichotomist designs do 
not allow for investigating how different materialities―colours, textures, etc.―influence the 
problem solving process. 
7 One might object that since the expiry phase in nature is task-unrelated (since the task is 
already solved), then all actions in this phase are aesthetic in that they are non-functional. 
However, to count as an aesthetic action, it is not sufficient that it is task-unrelated; it must 
furthermore transform the physical layout of the environment in order to make it more 
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ordered. Thus, picking one’s nose, cleaning teeth with a pipe cleaner, or playing zoo with the 
zebras are not aesthetic actions in the sense intended here. 
8 The current paper has shown how this process is perhaps not methodical seen from a task-
defined perspective, but seen from an aesthetic perspective, her actions are rather methodical. 
This insight suggests that a reformulation of Steffensen’s initial description of solution-
probing is needed. The main point is that the “search for something” is driven by some 
characteristic cognitive or behavioural principle (e.g. aesthetics) that can be identified in a 
Cognitive Event Analysis. 
9 The search was performed on 10 December 2014, using the following two ‘key word’ 
search strings in PsycINFO: 
1. ((”test hypothes*” OR ”testing hypothes*”) OR (”evaluate hypothes*” OR 
”evaluating hypothes*”)) AND “cognitive psychology” 
2. ((”generate hypothes*” OR ”generating hypothes*”) OR (”create hypothes*” OR 
”creating hypothes*”) OR (”produce hypothes*” OR ”producing hypothes*”)) AND 
“cognitive psychology” 
10 By transactional we mean that neither the agent nor the environment can be independently 
specified without considering the dynamic coupling. 
11 The rich literature on cueing is a valid example of such oscillations because it shows how 
environmental cues can perturb a habitual pattern of behaviour, so the cognitive agent needs 
to apply neural resources to engage in solution-probing (Steffensen, 2013), using material 
artefacts and other environmental resources. 
